Abstract-Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have received a lot of attention recently, adapting proxy re-signature to work in such environments is challenging. In this paper, we propose a novel and efficient proxy re-signature scheme, which provides a flexible and secure way for authorizing the new nodes of mobile ad-hoc networks. The proposed scheme is unidirectional, single-use and non-transitive. Compared with the previous schemes, we need only a few public parameters and no pairing operation in signature and resignature algorithms. We will also give the concrete security analysis of the proposed scheme. Its security is based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Thus, the scheme is suitable for the mobile ad-hoc networks, for it is completely non-interactive and is very simple.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] , [2] proposed the proxy re-signature, in which a semi-trusted proxy converts a delegatee's signature into a delegator's signature on the same message. The proxy transforms the signature with some secure information, but cannot generate original signature on behalf of the delegatee and the delegator. The first proxy re-signature scheme proposed by Blaze et al. [1] is bidirectional, multi-use. However, the scheme is not secure. It is possible for everybody to recover the re-sign key that should be stored at the proxy. This precludes the possibility of anyone having the resigning right and the delegator can recover the delegatee's secret key or vice versa. Dodis and Ivan [3] revisited the notion of proxy cryptography. However, the user in their constructions should store secret share for each signature delegation the user gives or accepts. Ateniese and Hohenberger [4] proposed another two proxy resignature schemes. One is bidirectional multi-use, and another is unidirectional single-use. The schemes above did not proved secure. Later, Shao et al. [5] proposed the first bidirectional proxy re-signature which is existentially unforgeable in the standard model and the first ID-based proxy re-signature scheme. Both the schemes suffered from the relatively large size of public parameters and the considerable computation overheads. However, Kim et al. [6] discussed about Shao et al. [5] 's scheme, by presenting an attack and making improvements. Furthermore, Libert and Vergnaud [7] proposed multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signature schemes based on bilinear groups in random oracle model and in standard model. Sunitha et al. [5] proposed another unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme with forward-secure. Chow et al. [8] showed how to design a generic unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme, and how to incorporate the concept of forward-security into the proxy re-signature. Deng and Song [9] present a proxy re-signature scheme based on quadratic residues, which is bidirectional and is secure under the random oracle model. More and more experts focus on the study of proxy re-signature with kinds of properties [10] , [11] , such as certificateless, traceability and blindness.
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have received a lot of attention for its rapid expanding range of capabilities and various uses. The mobile ad-hoc network [12] , [13] is a collection of nodes, in which the nodes communicate amongst each other using wireless radios and operate in dynamic and ad-hoc manners. Applications of mobile ad hoc networks are very extensive, such as military tactical operations, civil rapid development, data collection, sensor networks, and meeting room applications. In these application, nodes may be dynamically added to the system, however their public keys and identities could not be signed by the certificate authority (CA) before deployment. If the authorized node can do the job instead, it will be interesting. When the certification is need, a semi-trusted third party can translate the authorized node's signature into the CA's certification. Such primitive is referred to as threshold signatures in cryptography.
Security of mobile ad hoc networks has become a more sophisticated problem than security in other networks. Blaze et al. categorized re-signature scheme [1] . If the re-sign key allows the proxy to transform A's signature to B's but not vice verse, then the scheme is called unidirectional. If re-sign key allows the proxy to transform A's signature to B's as well as B's to A's, then the scheme is called bidirectional. Depending on its application, a proxy re-signature scheme could satisfy other properties [5] : multi-use, key optimal, non-transitive and temorary. In a multi-use scheme, the re-signature can also be transformed, while in a single-use scheme, only the original signature can be transformed. In a key optimal scheme, a user is required to store only a small constant amount of secrets, regardless of how many signature delegations the user gives or accepts. In a non-transitive scheme, the proxy cannot delegate his re-signing right with itself alone. In a temporary scheme, the re-signing right is temporary. Nodes are receptive to being captured, compromised, and hijacked since they are units capable of roaming independently.
Proxy re-signatures provide a flexible and secure way for the nodes to join into the networks dynamically, all that is needed is the assurance that the authorized node can represent the CA. In the mobile ad-hoc networks, communication bandwidth may be constrained, expensive communication primitives like broadcast may not be available, and transmitting large amount of data or heavy interaction may be infeasible. Adapting proxy re-signature schemes to work in such environments is challenging.
In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we give the formal definition of unidirectional proxy re-signature, which adopt Shao et al.'s game-based definition [5] and make some modifications to make it suitable for unidirectional proxy re-signature. Shao et al.'s model requires both two users are corrupted, or both are uncorrupted, which increase the failure possibility of the re-sign key oracle. Our game-based definition no longer restricts the corruption of proxies between corrupted and uncorrupted parties. We set original signature security as well as re-signature security. The original signature should remain secure even when the re-sign key is exposed. In other words, the colluding delegatee and proxy can not forge the delegator's original signature, either the colluding delegator and proxy. Moreover, Shao et al.'s game define the bidirectional proxy re-signature, while we define the unidirectional case.
Furthermore, we give a concrete implementation of proxy re-signature. The scheme is unidirectional, single use, key optimal and non-transitive. It is very attractive for its simplicity. Compared with the previous schemes, our scheme needs only a few public parameters and no pairing operation in signature and re-signature algorithms. The colluding delegatee and proxy can not forge the delegator's original signature and vice versa. We protect the signing key of the delegator and the delegatee. Security of this scheme can be reduced to Computational DiffieHellman (CDH) assumption in the random oracle model [14] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some preliminaries. Section III presents the unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme. Section IV analyzes its security and performance. Conclude in section V with a brief summary.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Proxy Re-Signature
In this section, we will give the definitions of singleuse unidirectional proxy re-signature primitive. The gamebased definition adopt Shao et al.'s game-based definition [5] and make some improvements. We don't restrict the corruption of proxies between corrupted and uncorrupted parties. We set original signature security, while the original signature remains secure even when the re-sign key is exposed.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme, where the re-sign key from pk A to pk B should not provide the ability of computing the re-sign key from pk B to pk A . The proxy re-signature scheme is a tuple of algorithms (KeyGen,ReKey,Sign,ReSign,Verify):
On input the security parameter 1 k , the key generation algorithm, KeyGen, outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
-ReKey(sk A , sk B ) → rk A→B . In the single-use unidirectional proxy re-signature scheme, on input two secret keys sk A and sk B , the re-sign key generation algorithm, ReKey, outputs a re-sign key rk A→B . Remarks: the bidirectional proxy re-signature scheme would output the bidirectional re-sign key rk A↔B instead of unidirectional re-sign key rk A→B .
-Sign(sk, m) → σ. On input the secret key sk and the message m, the signature algorithm, Sign, outputs a signature σ.
-Resign(rk A→B , pk A , m, σ) → σ . On input the re-sign key rk A→B , the message m and the signature σ on m corresponding to pk A , the re-signature algorithm, Resign, outputs a new signature σ on m under pk B .
-Verify(pk, m, σ) → f . On input the public key pk, the message m and the signature σ, the verification algorithm, Verify, outputs 1 or 0.
1) Game-based Definition:
In this section, we give the game-based definition. The game-based definition is proposed by formulating the requirements for correctness and consistency of proxy re-signature scheme.
The security notions we discussed here are existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack (CMA). We adopt Shao et al.'s game-based definition but make some improvements. firstly, They require both two users are corrupted, or both are uncorrupted, Which increase the failure possibility of the re-sign key oracle. Our game-based definition no longer restricts the corruption of proxies between corrupted and uncorrupted parties. Secondly, we set original signature security as well as re-signature security. The original signature should remain secure even when the re-sign key is exposed. In other words, the colluding delegatee and proxy can not forge the delegator's original signature, either the colluding delegator and proxy. Denote A's probability to forge a valid original signature or a valid re-signature by Adv A = P r [Asucceeds] . A proxy re-signature scheme is existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack if for every adversary A, Adv A is negligible.
B. The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH)
Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a generator of G. 
III. PROXY RE-SIGNATURE SCHEME
A. Proxy Re-Signature Scheme
Our scheme requires a bilinear map, e :
, where g and h are generators of G 1 , and H is a hash function from arbitrary strings to elements in Z p . Scheme PRS =(KeyGen, ReKey, Sign, ReSign, Verify) is described as follows: -KeyGen: On input the security parameter 1 k , select a random a ∈ Z p * , and output the key pair pk = g a and sk = a. 
δ+r , and output σ = (δ , R, K, K ); otherwise, output ⊥. We call this form the re-signature.
On input public key pk, message m and the purported signature σ, set ω = H(m|R|K), do: 1) If σ = (δ, R, K) is an original signature, δ here equals a · H(m|R|K) + r. That is to say, if g δ ≡ pk B ω · R mod p, it is a correct original signature, the scheme outputs 1, otherwise outputs 0 for instead.
, it is a correct re-signature, the scheme outputs 1, otherwise output 0 for instead.
The proposed scheme is composed of these five algorithms. they may be executed by the same parties or other parties, they may have potentially related inputs and the scheduling of message delivery may be adversarily coordinated. Furthermore, the local outputs of a protocol execution may be used by other protocols in an unpredictable way.
B. Security
The correctness and consistency properties are easily observable. We now show that our scheme is PRS-CMA secure in the random oracle model, where cryptographic hash functions are replaced by a random oracle. This model was rigorously formalized and fully exploited by Bellare and Rogaway [15] , and thereafter used in numerous papers. Proof. Recall that CDH and mCDH are equivalent, the theorem can also be proved as follows. If there exists an adversary A that can break the above proxy re-signature scheme with non-negligible probability ε in time t after making at most q S sign queries, q RS resign queries, q K corrupted key queries, q RK rekey queries and q H hash queries, then there also exists an adversary B that can solve the mCDH problem in G 1 with probability
, the mCDH adversary B's goal is to compute g ab . B sets up the global parameters for A: the security parameter k ≥ |p|, the groups G 1 = g , G 2 , their prime order p, and the mapping e. The system parameters are (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , g, h, H) , where H is random oracle.
Queries: B builds the following oracles:
. if pk i and pk j are both corrupted, or pk i is uncorrupted and pk j is corrupted, B returns Forgery: If B does not abort as a consequence of one of the queries above, A will, with probability at least ε, return a message m * and a valid σ * on m * . If the forgery is the original signature, we have the conclusion that the triplet ElGamal-family signature which is provably unforgeable under ROM following the forking lemma. If the forgery is the re-signature, the forgery must be of the form δ
To conclude, we analyze the probability that B completes the simulation without aborting. The probability of
, where E 1 denotes forge the original signature and E 2 denotes forge the resignature, respectively. P r[
Thus, the theorem follows. 2
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Performance
This scheme is unidirectional, single-use and nontransitive. The proxy transforms manager B's signature to company A's signature, and the verifier can be convinced that the signature contains the manager B's signature and the seal maintainer (semi-trusted proxy) of the company.
With our best knowledge, there is few provable secure proxy re-signature scheme. Ateniese and Hohenberger [4] proposed unidirectional single-use scheme, which did not proved secure. Kim et al. [6] discussed about Shao et al. [5] 's scheme, by presenting an attack and making improvements. Thus, we compare our security definition with Shao et al.'s.
Compared with the previous schemes, it is simple and efficient. In the signature algorithm and re-signature algorithms, the parties only need modular and multiplicative operations within the group G 1 . The scheme does the time consuming paring operation only when verifying the re-signature. Unlike Kim et al.'s scheme, which has relatively large size of public parameters. We have a few public parameters (e, p, G 1 , G 2 , g, h, H) . The security of our scheme can be reduced to Computational DiffieHellman (CDH) assumption in the random oracle model. Furthermore, since each user just stores one signing key, the scheme is also key optimal.
B. Application
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have received a lot of attention for its rapid expanding range of capabilities and various uses. The mobile ad-hoc network is a collection of nodes, in while the nodes communicate amongst each other using wireless radios and operate in dynamic and ad-hoc manners. Applications of mobile ad hoc networks are very extensive, such as military tactical operations, civil rapid development, data collection, and sensor networks. In these application, nodes may be dynamically added to the system, however their public key and identification could not be signed by the certificate authority (CA) before deployment. If the authorized node can do the job instead, it will be interesting. When the certification is need, a semi-trusted third party can translate the authorized node's signature into the CA's certification.
We suggest that the proposed scheme can minimize the damage caused by agents' misuse. In this scheme, all the signing is still done by the mobile agent, all the mobile agents hold its secret sharing. Only when more than t mobile agents are corrupted, the mobile agents system was insecure. Compared with the previous threshold proxy signature schemes, the proposed scheme reduces large amounts of modular exponential computations and communications. Therefore, it can be applied to the mobile agent. The security of this scheme depends on the underlying threshold signature schemes. The proposed scheme is suitable for the mobile ad-hoc networks, for it is completely non-interactive and has simple algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formally present a novel proxy resignature scheme, which is unidirectional, single-use, key optimal and non-transitive. The proposed scheme is simpler, and the security can be reduced to Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
